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Abstract 
 
How will improvements in information technology affect growth of cities? Futurists have sug-
gested that as telecommunications technology improves there will be no need for face-to-face con-
tact and therefore cities, in which face-to-face interactions are facilitated, will become obsolete. 
This paper develops a general model where individuals involved in a relationship use two modes 
of interaction, face-to-face interactions and electronic communications. Comparative static analy-
sis on the optimal solutions shows that improvements in telecommunications technology may in-
crease or decrease the demand for face-to-face interactions, depending whether face-to-face inte-
ractions and telecommunications are substitutes or complements. The placement of the model 
within a spatial framework shows that city size increases with electronic communications if face-
to-face interactions and electronic communications are complements. 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
ow will advances in telecommunications technology affect location decisions and the size of cities? 
Futurists have argued that improvements in electronic communications will reduce the demand for 
face-to-face interactions, and therefore will make cities, in which face-to-face interactions are facili-
tated, obsolete.
1
 In an attempt to examine the interdependence between improvements in electronic communications 
and face-to-face interactions, Gaspar and Glaeser (1998) developed a general model where either telecommunica-
tions or face-to-face interactions are used in a relationship and show that advanced communications technology can 
either increase or decrease both face-to-face interactions and city size. Panayides (2001) using a specific quadratic 
function presented a model in which allow the simultaneous use of both modes of interaction, face-to-face and elec-
tronic communications, in a relationship. Panayides (2001) assumed that better electronic communications do not 
increase the payoff from face-to-face interactions, and second, that more valuable face-to-face interactions do not 
increase the payoff from electronic communications. In this paper we extend Panayides analysis by relaxing both of 
these assumptions.  
 
2. The Payoff Model 
 
In this section we construct a payoff model using a quadratic function to examine the effects of improve-
ments in electronic communications on the time spent on face-to-face interactions.  First, the quadratic function is so 
constructed that face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are substitutes (general model I), and then 
such that face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are complements (general model II).  
 
General Model I (Face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are substitutes)
2
: Consider a 
representative agent involved in relationships with other agents. The relationships are conducted using both electron-
ic communications and face-to-face contact.   
 
 
Readers with comments or questions are encouraged to contact the authors via email. 
                                                          
1 Toffler (1980), Negroponte (1995), Naisbitt (1995), and Knoke (1996) are recent scholars who support this view and predict the end of cities. 
2 The structure of the general and urban models is similar to Panayides (2001). 
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The payoff of the relationships depends on the time spent on electronic and face-to-face interactions and is 
given by the following function, 
 
,
22
2
12
2
1
f
bt
e
t
ef
a
f
a
e
a
f
tb
ff
a
e
t
ee
a
f
bt
f
a
e
t
e
aV  3                     (1) 
 
where: et  is the time spent on electronic communications, ft   is the time spent on face-to-face communications b is 
the fraction of face-to-face communication that is productive, ea  is the parameter that increases the productivity of 
electronic communications, and fa  is the parameter that increases the value of face-to-face interactions. Note that 
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implying that face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are substitutes.  
 
 Both modes of interaction, face-to-face and electronic use a common input, time, which is available at cost c 
per unit. The total cost of engaging in interactions is then given by the following function,  
 
 .fe ttcC    
 
 The individual is then faced with the problem of maximizing her net payoff from interactions, i.e., she is faced 
with the following problem: 
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 The first order conditions (FOCs) for payoff maximization are 
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 Both first order conditions imply that the marginal payoff from either mode of interaction must be equal with 
the marginal cost, i.e., the opportunity cost of time. 
 
                                                          
3 The difference between the payoff function (1) and the payoff function in Panayides (2001) is that ae and af affect both te and tf, which implies 
that if the two modes of interaction are substitutes, both partial derivatives 
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are not zero anymore but negative. 
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  The second order conditions (SOCs) for a maximum are that the following Hessian determinant be positive: 
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  Using (3) and (4) the following optimal solutions for 
*
et and 
*
ft are obtained: 
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  We now investigate how an improvement in telecommunications technology affects the time spent on ei-
ther mode of interaction. First, the effect on the optimal time spent of electronic communications is as follows: 
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  Since the first term in the above expression is positive, the second term is positive by the FOCs, and the 
Hessian determinant is also positive by the second order conditions, it follows that ,0
*

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i.e., an improvement 
in electronic communications increases the time spent on electronic interactions, since now it’s easier and faster to 
communicate electronically.  
 
  Second, the effect of improvements in telecommunications technology on the optimal time spent on face-
to-face interactions is as follows: 
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  Since the first term in the above expression is negative by the FOCs, the second term is negative and the 
Hessian determinant is also positive by the second order conditions, it follows that ,0
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i.e., an improvement 
in electronic communications decreases the time spent on face-to-face interactions. 
 
  In addition the following comparative static result is needed to determine the effect of advances in informa-
tion technology on city size, 
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 Result (10) implies that an increase in the productive time of face-to-face contact will decrease the time 
spent on electronic contact, as people substitute electronic with face-to-face contact.     
 
  General Model II: (Face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are complements): The 
payoff from the relationships is now given by the following function, 
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implying that face-to-face interactions and electronic communica-
tions are complements. As in model I, the individual maximizes her net payoff form the relationships. Namely, she 
is faced with the following problem:  
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  The first order conditions (FOCs) for payoff maximization are 
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  As in model I, both first order conditions imply that the marginal payoff from either mode of interaction 
must be equal with the marginal cost, i.e., the opportunity cost of time. 
 
 Following similar analysis as in the general model I, the following optimal solutions 
*
et and 
*
ft are ob-
tained: 
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4 The difference between the payoff function (11) and the payoff function in Panayides (2001) is that ea and fa affect both et and ft , which 
implies that if the two modes of interaction are complements, both partial derivatives 
fe at
V

 2
and 
ef abt
V

 2
are not zero anymore but posi-
tive. 
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  We now investigate how an improvement in telecommunications technology affects the time spent on ei-
ther mode of interaction. These effects are:  
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  These results imply that, if face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are complements, an 
improvement in electronic communications increases the time spent on both modes of interactions. The reason for 
this result is that an improvement in electronic communications unambiguously increases the time spent on electron-
ic communications since, as stated above, now it’s easier and faster to communicate electronically, result (17). 
Hence, if electronic communications and face-to-face interactions are complements, then improvements in commu-
nications technology will also increase the time spent on face-to-face interactions, result (18). 
 
  In addition the following comparative static result is needed to determine the effect of advances in informa-
tion technology on city size, 
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  Result (19) implies that an increase in the productive time of face-to-face contact will increase the time 
spent on electronic contact.  
 
  From both general models we can conclude that improvements in communications technology unambi-
guously increases the time spent on electronic communications. However, improvements in communications tech-
nology increase the time spent on face-to-face interactions only if face-to-face interactions and electronic interac-
tions are complements. If they are substitutes then improvements in communications technology results in reduction 
of time spent on face-to-face interactions. 
 
3. The Urban Model 
 
  In this section the payoff model developed above is placed within a spatial framework to examine how 
changes in electronic communications affects the location choice of a resident. A representative agent may work in 
the city center or outside the city, which is referred to as the hinterland. The differences between the city and the 
hinterland are commuting cost and rent premiums for housing, which are denoted by HN, where N is the population 
of the city. The other difference between the two locations is that, we assume that the city facilities face-to-face inte-
ractions, i.e., the fraction of face-to-face interactions that is productive is higher in the city than in the hinterland.    
 
  As in the case of the payoff model, similarly in the urban model, first, the quadratic function is so con-
structed that face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are substitutes (urban model I), and then such 
that face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are complements (urban model II).  
 
  Urban Model I (Face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are substitutes): The payoff and 
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net payoff functions for a resident are given as follows, 
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  The focus here is to examine how an improvement in electronic communications affects the location choice 
of a resident. Since except for the congestion cost differences, the city and the hinterland differ in the productivity of 
face-to-face communication, in order to examine this effect we need the effect of b  on .
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.feeffe
e
bttaat
a
V



                  (22) 
 
 Differentiating (22) with respect to b  yields 
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  The expression (23) is negative because if face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are 
substitutes then 0


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te
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 Since by as-
sumption the fraction of face-to-face interactions that is productive is higher in the city than in the hinterland, i.e., b  
is higher in the city than in the hinterland, result (23) implies that an improvement in electronic communications in-
creases the payoff less for city residents than for those in the hinterland. Hence more people will move out of the 
city, to avoid the higher living and commuting costs, and thus city population will fall. In other words, if face-to-
face interactions and electronic communications are substitutes, an improvement in electronic communications de-
creases city size.   
 
  Urban Model II (Face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are complements): The payoff 
and net payoff functions for a resident are given as follows, 
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5 For a hinterland resident there are no costs HN. This does not affect any of the results since HN is a constant. R denotes the agricultural rent. 
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  Following similar analysis as in Urban Model I, since the difference between the city and the hinterland is 
only the productivity of face-to-face communication, in order to examine how improvements in electronic commu-
nication affects location decisions by residents, we need the effect of b  on .
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function (24) with respect to ea yields 
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  Differentiating (26) with respect to b  yields 
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  The expression (27) is positive because if face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are 
complements then 0
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

b
bt f
 Following 
the same logic as above, since by assumption b  is higher in the city than in the hinterland, result (27) implies that 
an improvement in electronic communications increases the payoff more for city residents than for residents of the 
hinterland. Hence more people will move into the city and thus city population will rise. In other words, if face-to-
face interactions and electronic communications are complements, an improvement in electronic communications 
increases city size.  
 
  From both urban models we can conclude that an improvement in electronic communications may increase 
or decrease city size. Particularly, if face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are complements then 
improvements in telecommunications technology will increase city size, while if they are substitutes then improve-
ments in telecommunications technology will decrease city size.   
 
4. Conclusion 
 
  In this paper we developed a model using a specific quadratic function to examine the interdependence be-
tween face-to-face interactions and electronic communications. The general model shows that improvements in 
communications technology increases the time spent on electronic interactions, but the effect on face-to-face interac-
tions is ambiguous. Specifically, improvements in communications technology increase the time spent on face-to-
face interactions only if the two modes of interaction are complements. The placement of the model within an urban 
framework shows that if the face-to-face interactions and electronic communications are complements then im-
provements in telecommunications technology increases city size.   
 
References 
 
1. Gaspar and Glaeser (1998), “Information Technology and the Future of Cities”, Journal of Urban Econom-
ics, 43, 136-156. 
2. Knoke, K. (1996), Bold New World: The Essential Road Map to the Twenty-First Century, Kodansha, 
New York. 
3. Naisbitt, R. (1995), The Global Paradox, Avon Books, New York. 
International Business & Economics Research Journal                                                           Volume 1, Number 11 
 48 
4. Negroponte, N. (1995), Being digital, Vintage Books, New York. 
5. Panayides, A. (2001), “The effects of Improvements in Information Technology on Growth of Cities”, Mi-
meo. 
6. Toffler, A. (1980), The Third Wave, Bantam Books, New York. 
 
 
Notes 
 
